GHANA’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY UNDER KWAME NKRUMAH

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ABSTRACT: The concept of public diplomacy is one of the trending approaches in modern international relations and diplomacy. Communicating and engaging effectively with the foreign public in a particular nation by a government to achieve its foreign policy objective is every government’s goal. The field of public diplomacy as an academic discipline in Ghana in particular and Africa has not received much attention compared to the Western World. This article attempts to bridge this gap by opening Ghana’s public diplomacy to academic scrutiny that has, as yet, been underdeveloped. This paper’s principal objective is to bring to light the public diplomacy instruments used by the indefatigable first president of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, to propagate his pan-Africanism foreign policy in the 1960s against capitalism and communism after Ghana’s independence. It also looks briefly at Nkrumah’s general foreign policy agenda through the lens of public diplomacy. Methodologically, it uses content analysis of documents to explore how Nkrumah adopted the public diplomacy tactics during his presidency to sell his foreign policy. The article explores the topic under the theoretical framework of Golan’s Integrated Public Diplomacy model. It concludes that public diplomacy under Kwame Nkrumah should be the foundation and ignite its incorporation into Ghana’s tertiary education and current foreign policy strategies.

KEYWORDS: public diplomacy, communication, Kwame Nkrumah, pan-Africanism, foreign policy

Introduction

International public perception of a country is crucial for the success of its foreign policy agenda, and therefore public diplomacy strategies are necessary instruments to engage target foreign publics for positive perception and image of a nation. This idea was not much of a concern for the newly decolonised African states, especially during the cold war, as these small countries were more focused on internal politics and restructuring their new countries. Melissen (2005) notes that public diplomacy was not a primary concern in developing countries during the Cold War. However, this assertion may not be entirely accurate as the case of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana proves otherwise. The father of Ghana’s model of pan-Africanism, Kwame Nkrumah, was more concerned about his foreign policies than internal affairs of the country (Asante K. 2014) and believed in the later stage of his presidency that the only way to achieve his foreign policy is to change its strategy and direction. Instead of going direct to engage his fellow African leaders, he instead preferred to engage the publics of these African nations since he realised the importance of foreign public opinion in international statecraft.

Research on the topic began with a hypothesis that Ghana has no trace of historical public diplomacy practice. As the research progressed in pursuit of scholarly evidence to uphold this premise, it became evident from the relevant literature that Ghana has a historical practice of public diplomacy and had a well-established agent to manage it. There might be varying literature delving into the Ghanaian concept and Africa in general in the coming years.

Furthermore, the author acknowledges the limited literature available on Ghanaian public diplomacy and therefore relies more on the historical accounts of the presidency of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah by a number of research-based materials. Mediated public diplomacy dimension among the three dimensions of the integrated model of public diplomacy serves as the philosophical paradigm of exploring the topic. Nkrumah was concerned about the media and broadcasting as a short-term strategy for foreign audiences’ engagement to build medium and long-term relations.
The article examines the historical evolution of Ghanaian public diplomacy during the administration of Kwame Nkrumah and how Nkrumah used public diplomacy as a critical instrument of Nye’s soft power during the era of decolonisation, African liberation and unity, and the cold war. It is a historical assessment of the varied instruments that the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) employed to tell ‘Ghana’s story to Africans in the continent’ and its frontiers. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who, together with some other freedom fighters, fought for Ghana’s independence, became its first Prime Minister prior to independence and later in 1960 its first president after the country became ‘Republic’ on 1 July 1960 (Asante K. 2014). Furthermore, he was indisputably the most influential political leader and philosophical thinker in Africa during that period (Baah-Duodu 2019).

Historically, Ghana’s diplomacy and Diplomatic Missions began in 1955 before the independence in 1957 (Asante K. B. 2017; Brandful 2014). Ghana, then Gold Coast in 1955, admitted for the first time ten officers among the hundreds of applications after advertisement into the about to be formed diplomatic Service. In Brandful (2013) opinion, these officers, popular known as the Group 10 (G10) in the Ghanaian diplomacy parlance, became the core of the nation’s fledgling diplomatic Service. The G10 had crash training in London at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baah-Duodu 2019). They were the first Ghanaian Diplomats to represent and project the country’s image and reputation on the international statecraft after the independence. The then Prime Minister of Ghana and later president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, met the G10 and shared his visions on international relations (Brandful 2013, 27). After its independence, Ghana’s diplomatic missions were established by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah to deepen its relations with the selected states (Asante 2017). Diplomacy encompasses public diplomacy; hence, understanding Ghanaian diplomacy’s genesis is a step to grasp its philosophical underpinnings.

The concept of Public Diplomacy

It worth noting that a fruitful exploration of Ghana’s public diplomacy demands an account of the already existing literature in the field, which will serve as the bedrock and framework of critically examining the discourse. Public diplomacy is not a new concept in the realm of international relations and communication. The ability to influence foreign publics as an essential ingredient of public diplomacy long pre-dates the existence of the term itself (Hunt 2015, 25). Some public diplomacy scholars also see it as putting an ‘old wine in a new bottle’ (Melissen 2005, 3). Moreover, the importance of public opinion in foreign nations and the cultivation of the image of a country goes far back to ancient Greece and Roman times, even with some references in the Bible (Kunczik 2009, 771). Thus, the phenomenon of nations’ image cultivation, propaganda, and other activities within the realm of public diplomacy are as old as diplomacy itself, argues Melissen. However, public diplomacy has gained considerable popularity in research in the last two decades and has become a crucial instrument in foreign policy implementation, especially in Western nations (Ociepka 2017).

Numerous literature reviews of public diplomacy show that Nye’s (2004, 2011) concept of ‘soft power’ is among the foundations of the discipline. It is universally acclaimed that part of the public diplomacy story is understanding Nye’s soft power (Cull 2019). Soft power is “getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opt people rather than coerces them” (Nye 2004, 5). It is not only about influence, says Nye, but it is also the ability to attract. The attraction, therefore, leads to acquiescence. Soft power can also be termed “attractive power” (Nye 2004, 6). It also can shape and influence the preferences of others. Nye believes that soft power may help a nation secure the support of foreign audiences for its foreign policy by means of the attractiveness of its culture, values, and international policy (Golan 2017). Nye adds that soft power combined with hard power produces smart power – combining military power and soft power. A nation cannot have one without the other and vice versa. Fletcher (2016) puts it nicely that a country
needs boots on the ground and books in the hand. Hunt (2015) also holds that Nye’s concept has an enormous impact on the practice of diplomacy as his ideas have been widely harnessed into the conventional wisdom of foreign ministries. Nye’s term is arguably the most referenced phrase in the public diplomacy lexicon, although it does not mean that all public diplomacy practitioners and scholars agree on its definition and application (Snow 2020, 4). Therefore, public diplomacy has relation with power. It has ‘soft power’ (Snow 2009).

The public diplomacy concept has no universally agreed definition. Many scholars of different related fields have come out with numerous definitions. Golan and Yang (2015) affirm this assertion by stating that despite a growing body of literature on public diplomacy, the confusion about what the term really means and how it differs from international public relations still exists. Even the US, which is considered the ‘father’ of public diplomacy, has not reached a single consensus definition of the concept over the last fifty years (Snow 2015, 80). For Cull (2019), it is diplomacy through foreign public engagement. Golan and Yang (2015, 2) see it as “the management of communication among diplomatic actors, including nations and non-state actors, which have specific informational or motivational objectives toward reaching the foreign public through various communication channels to promote national interest”. For other scholars, it is government-sponsored activities and communications with the sole aim of foreign publics (Fullerton and Kendrick 2017). Williams (2012) also defines it as the process of pursuing a nation’s foreign strategic objectives, while Rugh (2014) defines it as a function of a government. For this paper’s purpose, public diplomacy is defined as a form of diplomatic relations to promote national interest. For other scholars, it is diplomacy through foreign public engagement. Golan and Yang (2015, 2) see it as “the management of communication among diplomatic actors, including nations and non-state actors, which have specific informational or motivational objectives toward reaching the foreign public through various communication channels to promote national interest”. For other scholars, it is government-sponsored activities and communications with the sole aim of foreign publics (Fullerton and Kendrick 2017). Williams (2012) also defines it as the process of pursuing a nation’s foreign strategic objectives, while Rugh (2014) defines it as a function of a government. For this paper’s purpose, public diplomacy is defined as a form of diplomatic relations that focuses on persuading, influencing, and winning the minds and hearts of another country’s public. And through indirect methods such as educational exchange programmes, culture, health by a government or multinational companies for political goals. The stakeholders in this form of diplomacy are the state and the non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and other international corporations.

The term was first used by an American Diplomat Edmund Gullion in 1965 to distinguish the concept from propaganda during the Cold War (Berridge 2015; Cull 2019; Cull 2020; Hunt 2015; Fullerton and Kendrick 2017; Golan and Yang 2015; Rugh 2014; Melissen 2005; Wang and Yang 2020). Therefore, it is not surprising that modern public diplomacy and its discourse are dominated by the United States’ experience and literature (Melissen 2005). Some scholars argue that the concept of public diplomacy is a product of war (Hunt 2015). Eytan Gilboa argues that while many scholars and practitioners have examined and explored public diplomacy, there is, however, no “overarching theory, but rather contributions from multiple disciplines” as cited in (Cull 2019, 2). Therefore, it lacks a unique theoretical underpinning peculiar to the field (Golan 2017). This is one of the major challenges facing the discipline. However, scholars of the field have begun to develop theoretical paradigms. Among them are Golan’s (2013) Integrated Model of public diplomacy and Fullerton and Kendrick’s (2017) Model of Country concept of public diplomacy. This article uses the former as a theoretical framework for the exploration of Ghana’s public diplomacy under its first president Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

The integrated model argues that examination of public diplomacy should be done as a strategic management approach (Golan and Yang 2015, 3). Put, a combination of public relations practice and tactics with public diplomacy objectives and results (Snow 2015). The model has three layers of engagement, namely mediated public diplomacy, nation brands/reputation, and relational public diplomacy (Golan 2015). The mediated dimension is a short-term media activity by the government aiming to influence international media coverage. This layer focuses on adopting tactics to manage the content of foreign news coverage. The other two levels of nation-branding/reputation and relational deal with medium and long-term strategic engagement approaches. Golan argues that fruitful mediated public diplomacy efforts are necessary for a nation’s successful nation-branding or reputation management.

The public diplomacy discipline encompasses many tenets from other fields such as public relations, mass communication, public policy, political science, marketing, and diplomatic studies.
Since the introduction of the concept by Gullion, the discipline has evolved to include other private stakeholders in the practice of public diplomacy (Wang and Yang 2020). This evolution has often been termed the ‘new public diplomacy’ (Hunt 2015, 18; Melissen 2005). The new public diplomacy involves both private and state actors and the usage of the technological tools of communications in the modus operandi of public diplomacy campaigns. The new public diplomacy takes shape after the 11th September 2001 attack on the US (Taylor 2009), and as Melissen introduces it in his work The New Public Diplomacy. Some scholars also argue that the concept of public diplomacy is nothing special; it is rebranding white propaganda (Berridge 2015, 199). Furthermore, it is a subset and postmodern propaganda. One of the proponents of this argument, Berridge (2015), defines the discipline as the modern name for white propaganda aimed chiefly at international audiences. Thus, irrespective of the label, the central element remains. Rugh (2014, 10) also adds that during the Cold War, Americans wanted to distinguish their overseas activities from the negative connotations of ‘propaganda’ of being deceptive employed by the Germans and the Soviet Union hence the new phrase ‘public diplomacy’ by Gullion. In his analysis of the term’s evolution, Cull (2020) also connotes that although Gullion was the first to use the term in modern time, the old term (propaganda) has accumulated many negative connotations. In fact, Cull believes the earliest use of the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ dates back to 1856 in a piece from London Times (p.13). Berridge and Rugh, therefore, state that the United States Information Agency (USIA) was established in 1953 for overseas white propaganda (public diplomacy). Berridge again rejects the notion by some public diplomacy scholars and practitioners that the concept is different from propaganda and argues that it is not a new activity rather a rebranded propaganda. Public diplomacy does propaganda indirectly, making it different from black propaganda. I cannot entirely agree with the stance of Berridge because public diplomacy should not be equalised to the traditional propaganda, which had scrupulous tools of making its audience believe what was not true in reality. Traditional propaganda is only a one-way affair of communication, while public diplomacy is a two-way symmetrical communication and relationship building on engagement and dialogue with foreign publics. Melissen (2013) sees such views emanating from the traditionalists and sceptics within the diplomatic arena. Commenting on this debate, Melissen agrees with other contemporary scholars on public diplomacy who assert that modern public diplomacy is different from propaganda. The term ‘public diplomacy’ found its way into the foreign policy discourses and circles in the 1990s (Cull 2020, 16), and many nations began to be interested in the concept and practice for various reasons even long before the 9/11 attack (Melissen 2005). However, the style, targets, and vehicles employ to make public diplomacy vary enormously from country to country.

Kwame Nkrumah’s Foreign Policy

Public diplomacy is a significant component in foreign policy implementation, as the literature in the concept depicts. Besides, Melissen (2005) argues that sound foreign policies greatly support public diplomacy practice. Therefore, to successfully explore public diplomacy of Ghana under Nkrumah, it is necessary first to analyse some of his central foreign policies as president of the nation. During Nkrumah’s presidency, Ghana’s foreign policy and relations were guided by systematically expressed notions and principles rather than a set of national concerns as it were in other African countries in that era (Gerits 2015). Diplomacy and foreign policy under Dr. Nkrumah’s administration were at the latent stage. Being the first black African country to obtain independence brought challenges to nation-building and foreign relations (Brandful 2013). Urgency mixed with excellence became some of the core ingredients that motivated the first constitutional government to take action during that period. Two main factors influenced Nkrumah’s foreign policy and diplomacy: the Cold War and the
decolonisation of Africa (Boafo-Arthur 1999; Etsiah 1985; Thompson 1969; White 2003). The president made his Foreign Policies clear to the few Ghanaian diplomats assembled at the presidency before their departure to the various assigned posts abroad. The central foreign policies were: to transform Ghana from a colonial territory to an independent and prosperous nation; Ghana to lead the fight to eliminate colonial rule and administrations in the entire continent of Africa and unite it (Brandful 2013; White 2003). The government also introduced the policy of non-alignment to put the country in a neutral position during the Cold War of political ideologies between the West and the East (Asamoah 2014). Ghana is among the founding fathers of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). This foreign policy also enables the state to get developmental assistance from both sides of the blocs (Baah-Duodu 2019; Gerits 2015). Under this regime, the president also formulated the policy of good neighbourliness to have cordial relations with the country’s neighbouring nations and place Ghana as the sub-Saharan region leader in particular and Africa in general (Asamoah 2014; Brandful 2013).

His foreign policy of decolonisation of the African continent was firm in him as a pan-Africanist and manifested in his famous Ghana’s independence speech (Spies, 2018; White, 2003). He emphasised in the speech that ‘the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa’ (Thompson 1969). It is said that ‘Kwame Nkrumah is Africa and Africa is Kwame Nkrumah’ in his heydays (White 2003, 100). His famous dictum ‘the black man is capable of managing his own affairs’ propelled him to challenge other African leaders to unite and take control of their various countries (Baah-Duodu 2019).

As foreign policies and diplomacy of a country are determined, among other things, by its geopolitical locations, history, and ideological orientation of its leader, Ghana is not exempted from this theory. In the sixties, its foreign relations and diplomacy were influenced by its first president Kwame Nkrumah (Brandful 2013). His Foreign policy of championing Africa’s decolonization put Ghana in the limelight on the international stage both within the region and continent, respectively. Ghana’s role in Africa within these periods was significant. The policy of accelerated agenda for emancipation and development in the mid-sixties under Nkrumah and complete political emancipation and unification of Africa was Ghana’s main foreign relations objective (Brandful 2013; Asamoah 2014). Therefore, the country’s foreign policy and diplomacy were Africa-centric, anti-racism (against the apartheid system in South Africa), neutrality (NAM), good neighbourliness, adherence to principles, and charters of international organisation Ghana belongs (Gebe 2008).

Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism foreign policy was made up of his political and philosophical ideologies of anti-colonialism and ‘African personality backed by the historical theory of slavery and African unity mission (Gerits 2015). Nkrumah was so fascinated with pan-Africanism to the extent that it is said that ‘Africa was Nkrumah and vice versa. For him, ‘Africa was for Africans’ and called for no interference from the superpowers of the Cold War (Thompson 1969). Thus, his foreign policy of non-alignment. The Non-alignment policy was a way of driving away from the ideological war of winning the minds and hearts during the cold war, argues Thompson. This policy enabled Nkrumah to engage both the West and East for a developmental project of his country, although it is strenuous to be neutral in practice. He believed that Africa’s involvement in the war would instead create huge problems among African nations, including conflicts in the continent.

**Nkrumah’s public diplomacy (Discussion)**

The three leading major powers in the 1960s, the US, the Soviet Union, and Europe, invested heavily in their foreign communications with the rest of the world during the Cold War (Melissen 2005, 4). Nkrumah also did invest in his foreign policy implementation strategies as the country had enough funds and even gave financial assistance to other African countries like Guinea (Botwe-Asamoah 2005). There is a general view that public diplomacy strategies are
primarily aimed at establishing positive public opinion in a foreign nation that will help the target-
country political and governmental leaders to make decisions that are in line and supportive of the
foreign policy goals of the advocating country (Melissen 2005, 15). Ghana’s public diplomacy was
in line with Melissen’s assertion. Nkrumah concluded that the best option to get other African
leaders to support his pan-Africanism foreign policy is through the influence of the public opinion
of their citizenry (Gerits 2015).

Ghana’s diplomacy after attaining the republican status on 1 July 1960 became more
assertive through the instrumentality and foreign policy vision of its leader Nkrumah, argues
Gerits. Nkrumah used his public diplomacy strategy to carry out its foreign policy of non-
alignment during the cold war. At the later stage, Nkrumah realised the role and importance of
mass communication in the implementation of foreign policy, especially foreign public opinion. In
one of his UN speeches, he affirmed how international public opinion had compelled states to
operate in a more ethically acceptable manner (Gerits 956).

The Congo political crisis in 1960 was the turning point of Ghana’s public diplomacy
programme as the aftermath of the crisis changed the direction of Nkrumah’s strategies of foreign
policy implementation (Gerits 2015). Public diplomacy of Ghana was now redirected towards
specifically the African publics in the continent. The BBA believed that communicating with the
targeted publics in the African continent was the best approach since the foreign publics in Africa
had to convince their respective political leaders to support the African unity policy of Nkrumah
(Thompson 1969). The president of Ghana came to the realisation that unifying the entire continent
demands a clear and coherent ideological message. Additionally, these messages should be
presented more appealingly and emotionally to the target African publics. Therefore, since 1960,
the Bureau of African Affairs responsible for Ghana’s public diplomacy activities focused more on
engaging the target audiences in the other African countries, both independent and dependent
(Asamoah 2014).

The government of Ghana on 7 October 1961 assembled all the heads of Ghana’s
diplomatic missions in Africa in crucial meetings in Accra, to discuss among other things, the re-
examination of the nation’s foreign policy and how it could be efficiently and effectively ‘sold’ to
the target audiences in Africa (Gerits 2015, 960). In his open speech, Nkrumah reaffirmed the task
of the Ghanaian diplomat dispatched to the various missions in Africa, that is, the cultivation of a
favourable public opinion about Ghana in their host nations. To enhance this task, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in 1961 started to invest in the nation’s public diplomacy campaigns geared
towards African countries and the rest of the world. Exhibitions windows in London and New
York were organised. The Ghanaian diplomats were to make the country’s foreign policy attractive
and help push other independent African states into making a firm policy against external
interference of the affairs of Africa, argues Thompson. The BAA had researched and came out
with propaganda (public diplomacy) to diminish the seeming tension between Ghana and other
African states.

Post-colonial African leaders and diplomats were not mere pawns to the two major powers
of the Cold War; however, a little room was offered to them to operate. Despite this, Ghana’s
president used all means to counter communism and capitalism and therefore prescribed his own
pan-African ideology (Gerits 2015, 953). For Gerits, the new post-independent African nations
were very vulnerable to the whims and caprices of the external powers of the Cold War since any
of them could either help sustain an unpopular administration or sponsor an alternative regime.

Nkrumah’s main objective was to make Ghana attractive in the eyes of other African
leaders for influence to achieve the continental integration agenda. He employs one of Golan’s
three layers of the integrated model of public diplomacy, the mediated dimension, as a short-term
strategy. He resulted in international media coverage influence in the black continent. Gerits (2015)
notes that, in Accra, the president of Ghana established Radio Ghana. To attract other African
leaders and their citizens, all the radio emissions from Ghana had to state the source of the
broadcasting message. For example, ‘This is the Voice of Africa, coming to you live from Radio
Ghana, Accra.’ The result of broadcasting to other African nations with the aim to influence foreign publics for support of his African unity vision is public diplomacy tactics.

Besides, Nkrumah used what modern public diplomacy scholars refer to as ‘Summit Diplomacy’ as one of the tools to implement his pan-Africanism. He organised several Conferences in Accra to deepen the link between activists of pan-Africanism (Thompson 1969). For instance, between 15 – 23 April 1958, the Conference of Independent African States (CIAS). In that same year, Nkrumah arranged for another Conference of All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) in December (Gerits 2015).

Nkrumah also employed diaspora diplomacy as another element in his public diplomacy techniques. Diaspora diplomacy was central in his pan-Africanism policy (Botwe-Asamoah 2005). He gave a place for the African diasporas in his African liberation agenda, thereby inviting most of them to Ghana’s Independence Day and Republican ceremonies in Accra. Among the invited African Diasporas were Martin Luther King Jr., Adam Clayton Powell, and Asa Philip Randolph (Thompson 1969). Thus, in the realm of diaspora diplomacy, Africans in the Diaspora visited Ghana most often, and it became a common phenomenon under the presidency of Nkrumah (Botwe-Asamoah 2005, 114). Mohammed Ali and Malcolm X were among the notable African diasporas who visited Ghana and added their voice to the African liberation policy. This public diplomacy approach also helped Nkrumah reach out to the foreign publics through the Africans in the diaspora through information dissemination to tell Ghana’s story to the world.

To further the course of the public diplomacy agenda, the president established three new institutions in Ghana to be responsible for outreach activities to foreign publics. These institutions are the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS), The Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), and the All Trade Union Congress (ATUC) (Botwe-Asamoah 2005). It is worth noting that Nkrumah had a suspicion on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, bequeathed to Ghana by the colonial masters, as a secondary colonial mouthpiece. All three agencies had their specific roles assigned to them by the president. The AAS was charged with organising conferences of independent African states and nationalists movements. The BAA was the main body responsible for the public diplomacy job – a channel for information dissemination about the nation to overseas audiences, while the ATUC had the function of organising the Pan-African Federation Union. Therefore, these three institutions were the principal vehicles for pursuing the nation’s African policy (Botwe-Asamoah 2005, 110; Thompson 1969). However, BAA was the most powerful among them all and master planner of public diplomacy techniques.

The BAA had its headquarters at the presidential palace in Accra. The principal objective was to create a network and manage all the African international public relations issues (Gerits 2015). It was tasked to ensure the successful implementation of the president’s foreign policy of pan-Africanism. The Bureau is like the United States Information Agency (USIA) created in 1953 to be responsible for America’s public diplomacy agenda - to sell the US story to the world (Cull 2009). The same can be said of the BAA – to carry out Ghana’s public diplomacy programme in the continent. It was Ghana’s ‘Information Agency’ in Africa. In its official document defining its function, the BAA stated that it is an information office with a research department attached, plus a protocol unit, printing press, library, publication department, linguistic secretariat, and conference hall (Gerits 2015; Thompson 1969). It was charged to tell Ghana’s story in the African continent and beyond by engagement with targeted foreign publics through broadcasting, international dissemination information, exchange activity programmes, and other practical means. It became the central and principal agent of Ghanaian African foreign policy (Asamoah 2014).

The creation of the BAA by Nkrumah intensified and managed the decolonisation process and pan-Africanism (Asamoah 2014). It was, among other things, to coordinate all foreign policy and diplomatic matters pertaining to Africa (Brandful 2013). The location of BAA within the presidential compound indicates the emphasis Nkrumah put on his African liberation and unity foreign policy (Thompson 1969). The Bureau, to borrow the words of Baah-Duodo (2019), became the president’s “favourite son,” and it was endowed with all the resources that would
facilitate its mission (p. 17). The president will always first begin his day with African Affairs from 7:30 am – 9:00 am before delving into national issues (Asante K. 2014). The BAA was also the public diplomacy and public relations unit of Nkrumah’s foreign policy agendas (Gerits 2015, 956). It promoted ‘Nkrumahism’ (the political philosophy and ideologies of African emancipation and unity of Nkrumah) on the African continent. Ghana, under president Nkrumah, had two different state institutions in charge of the nation’s foreign policy, the BAA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gebe 2008). The BAA, however, was dissolved when the military took over power in 1966 and incorporated it into the Ministry of External Affairs (Asamoah, 2014; Baah-Duodo, 2019; Brandful, 2013).

Besides, various pan-Africanist political parties and organisation in other independent African states had their representative at the BAA (Thompson 1969). At the printing press unit, magazines, pamphlets, and other materials deemed helpful for public diplomacy information dissemination were printed in different languages and distributed across the continent. A monthly periodical magazine entitled ‘Voice of Africa’ was established and printed in Ghana with the notion that public diplomacy is more successful and influential than to borrow Nye’s phrase ‘hard power’ – guns (White 2003). The BAA tried through the nation’s public diplomacy practitioners (diplomats) to intensify its quest to engage and convince African audiences rather than their national leaders that Ghana was the only state capable of leading the continent to unify and manage the neo-colonial and imperialist tendencies and conspiracies (Gerits 2015, 961). BAA disseminated information abroad about Ghana and its culture, values, and policies through press, radio and publications, information media, and other information centres.

Nkrumah as a strong proponent of pan-Africanism, and some scholars even consider him to be the ‘father’ of Ghana’s version of the concept, enacted the foreign policy of Africa liberation of the entire African continent from the colonial administration, thus offered financial assistance to other African nationalists nations (Thompson 1969). Financial assistance was also a way of cultivating a positive image and reputation of Ghana on the continent. BAA also rebranded the country with the change of name from Gold Coast to Ghana (Wekesa 2020).

Nkrumah went further to establish some pan-Africanism ideological training institutes to indoctrinate his foreign policy into the minds of the younger generation in the continent (Botwe-Asamoah 2005). This approach is also one of the propaganda machinery of Ghana’s president. In line with these tactics, Kwame Nkrumah Youth Training School was established and opened with youth from the other African countries who came for training and returned to their various countries after completing a general course on youth leadership. For instance, 108 Gambians had their training at the institute (Gerits 2015). The Winneba Party College in 1961 was restructured and turned into the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute as part of the public diplomacy technique (Thompson 1969). The objective of this new institute, according to the president, was to propagate the essence and substance of the continental unity in Ghana and throughout African nations strongly.

Moreover, to strengthen Ghana’s public diplomacy under the presidency of Nkrumah, an advisor to the president George Padmore and later the director of the BBA was admonished by one WWK. Vanderpuye of Ghana’s Ministry of Education to adopt the cultural-exchange scholarship tool of public diplomacy implemented by India, Egypt, and the US (Gerits 2015). Ghana, therefore, ventured into it. This programme of Nkrumah is similar to the present-day US Fulbright Educational programme for overseas students as part of the American public diplomacy strategy.

As part of the information dissemination instrument of public diplomacy, Nkrumah’s BBA established various newspapers, printed and disseminated them. Newspapers such as the Ghanaian Times, the Daily dispatch, Evening News were state-owned, and copies were distributed to some selected educated Africans, news agencies of European nations, and other independent and dependent African countries (Asamoah 2014; Gerits 2015; Thompson 1969). The target audience for the newspapers was the educated public. The uneducated publics were served with cartoons.
communicating the meaning of being an African; postcards and other visual materials were made to showcase the need for continental unity.

In addition, the government of Nkrumah established the Ghana External Broadcasting Service and the Voice of Ghana to supplement the already existing public diplomacy strategies (Asamoah 2014). These services aimed to project the image and reputation of Ghana abroad, specifically within the continent. The president included it in the Second Five Year Development Plan (1959 -1964) to boost this new external broadcasting expansion. Thus, two Canadian Broadcasting Corporation advisors arrived in Ghana in March 1958 to establish a radio network (Gerits 2015). This method of Nkrumah can be compared to the modern era of Western countries establishing international broadcasting networks for public diplomacy purposes like the UK’s BBC, Americans VOA (Voice of America), the German’s DW network, French’s France24 network.

Results and Conclusion

The analysis above demonstrates that Ghana does have a solid historical public diplomacy root under its first pan-Africanist President Nkrumah. The discussion here depicts that it was systematically planned and financed with the needed resources to achieve its mission. Although Nkrumah did not achieve his African foreign policy of continental union of government as his vision was the ‘United States of Africa,’ his public diplomacy programmes greatly impacted the nation’s diplomacy and foreign relations. Brandful (2013) notes that Nkrumah made Ghana become the black star of Africa and the world. As a former Ghanaian diplomat, he argues that Ghana’s diplomacy has waned in modern international statecraft.

Ghana’s public diplomacy under president Nkrumah can be described as a model of ‘pan-Africanist public diplomacy.’ The state was the principal actor; hence it is a form of ‘state-based public diplomacy’ (Hocking 2005). We remember that Gullion coined the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ during the era of the Cold War. Thus, the concept within this period was taking a new shape with a little literature. Nkrumah’s public diplomacy may be viewed as ‘propaganda’ or any other phrase. However, if scholars accept the United States Information Agency (USIA) activities as public diplomacy campaign, Kwame Nkrumah’s foreign policy activities led by his BAA, as discussed in this article, should be equally accepted as public diplomacy. The Bureau of African Affairs of Nkrumah mirrored the USIA in terms of public diplomacy strategies. The USIA handled public diplomacy of America until its merger with the Department of State in 1999 (Rugh 2014), while BAA managed Ghana’s public diplomacy until 1966 when the military junta toppled Nkrumah’s administration.

In conclusion, Ghanaian public diplomacy under Nkrumah may have its shortfalls; nevertheless, it is among the pioneering African public diplomacy in the continent and first in Ghana. Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism foreign policy in the continent is regarded as one of the historical elements of African public diplomacy evolution (Wekesa 2020, 361). The article posits that Ghana should build on Nkrumah’s public diplomacy strategies and adopt them in its present foreign policy and diplomacy agenda. The present government of Ghana and its ministry of foreign affairs should make public diplomacy a part of their diplomatic toolbox with great interest rather than only lip service. Again, the public diplomacy discipline could be introduced into the curriculum of the country’s higher education system since, at the time of writing this article, the concept barely has a place in Ghana’s education system. It could be introduced at the beginning, for example, as a module in one of the Master’s degree programmes in international relations and diplomacy. It may also be incorporated into the training programmes of Ghana Foreign Service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at its Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy to equip Ghanaian diplomats and scholars of the new public diplomacy concept. It is essential to state that public diplomacy was significant for implementing Nkrumah’s foreign policy of anti-colonial, non-alignment, and pan-Africanism.
References


