

The Arab League and the Nationalism Dilemma

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ABSTRACT: Since the Arab League (AL) was founded in 1945, it has frequently been the target of harsh criticism. Additionally, AL's members' conflicting interests—which later became a highly polarized situation—were a result of both their diminishing credibility and their inability to come to a sincere agreement on the fundamental problems. These issues prevented the building from making any more progress in the future. Despite assertions to the contrary, the AL has persistently worked to maintain its piecemeal approach, arguing that Arab unity was its “raison d'être.” It is evident from certain clauses in the founding charter of the AL that the requirement for unanimity over adopted decisions has had a negative impact on the organization's development, as opposed to clauses that preserve the status quo of relationships between Arab states or the unquestionable reverence of each member state's sovereignty. Using theories of IR that offer a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of these institutional deadlocks, this study has also addressed the issue of Arab nationalism by testing its hypotheses in light of Neorealist and social constructivist findings, reviewing the institutional and theoretical framework behind the current structural anomalies within the AL. Thus, if Arab governments choose to adopt a Neorealist premise that in a society governed by self-help mechanisms, the materialistic, selfish viewpoint will continue to dominate state mentality. None could offer a thorough justification for the Arab state's decision to set aside its self-interest in favor of an established transnational organization like AL.

KEYWORDS: The Arab League (AL), Arab nationalism, inter-subjectivity, international system

Introduction

Despite their best efforts to include an original covenant in their charter, it was evident from the outset that the founders of the Arab League (AL) were unable to determine which of the choices listed below is the most advantageous identity and interests or regional and territorial states. They consequently fell short of their intended objectives. Nevertheless, there has been no attempt to harmonize the charter since it was adopted. The question of whether the Arab League should recognize the autonomy of independent AL members or preserve Pan-Arabism as an original covenant was not adequately settled, and Arab nationalists eventually gave up on the idea of an Arab nation-state when it came time to put their beliefs into practice.

Consequently, the founding members of the Arab League faced two extremely difficult decisions: the first was the desire to establish an organization that fosters the growth of nationalism in regional customs through mutual support, trust, and shared interests; the second was the ongoing uncertainty caused by the possibility of armed conflict between Arab states. As a result, the AL charter makes it very evident that these two difficult decisions were relevant in its fifth and sixth articles, respectively. It is prohibited for two or more League member states to use force to settle disputes with one another, according to Article V. If a dispute should arise between them that has nothing to do with a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity and the disputing parties turn to the council for resolution, the council's ruling will then be legally binding.

The states that are in conflict with each other in this situation are prohibited from participating in the deliberations or decisions of the council. The council will mediate any disputes that pose a threat of war between two member states or between a member state and a third state in order to aid in their reconciliation. In mediation and arbitration, decisions must be finally agreed by majority (League of Arab States 1945).

According to Article VI, "in case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member-state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council." The Council will determine what has to be done to stop the aggression by unanimous vote. If the aggressor is a member state, his vote will not be considered in determining unanimity.

If the attack keeps the government of the attacked state from contacting the Council, the state's representative in the Council will request that the Council meet for the reason outlined in the preceding paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council (Arab States League 1945). Nevertheless, there have been many attempts to develop a framework for nonviolent means of resolving disputes. One such attempt was the 1948 Joint Defense Agreement, which was forged by a proposal from Syria and created a military and political alliance. There are notably more Arab initiatives now, several decades later. A couple of examples are the attempt by Yemen to transform the AL into a 'United Arab States' and the proposal from Egypt to establish an "Arab Security Council" many Arab actors also have a strong influence on the AL's reform initiatives.

As noted earlier, most of AL's reform proposals seem to reinforce institutionalization efforts even more, as has been the norm in the majority of prosperous regional and international organizations like the EU, ASEAN, and NAFTA. Consequently, the members of the AL had been able to imitate those successful models by creating the Arab National Security Forum, which could advance the discussion about defense and security issues. Public awareness of security has grown, which has been a major factor in the AL's efforts to expand. However, the anomalies in the AL's charter and its poorly drafted declarations were readily apparent to observers, especially when it came to issues of foreign policy, defense, and security, where views between proponents of a cohesive approach and those who oppose it differ significantly. As a result, it is critical to contrast new readings with the existing theoretical framework. By doing this, it might be possible to gain fresh perspectives on nationalism and integration issues in the modern Arab world, where modernization objectives drove integration efforts rather than just a reaction against foreign domination.

Examining the Arab system as a subsystem, identities and interests are equally relevant because they are the fundamental elements upon which the social constructivist theory of international relations (IRT) bases its analysis of the international system. One could argue that due to state-to-state interactions within the international system, identities and interests are dynamic concepts that are constantly changing. The Arab states are therefore just 'actors' if identities and interests are enough to account for the overall structural change within the AL, along with somewhat human characteristics, intentionality, rationality, and interests. (Wendt 1999a). Stated differently, identification is a cognitive process wherein the boundaries between the self and the other get progressively blurred until they vanish completely. The other is 'classified' as the self (Wendt 1999a).

Realists, who contend that social identity groups help countries overcome their innate propensity for self-interest and advance toward a collective interest that transcends the 'Realist approach', reject constructivism. They contend that self-interested impulses serve as states' primary motivations. The process through which groups of people's common interests materialize as a result of ongoing social interaction is known as 'inter-subjectivity'.

This not only creates a shared understanding but also a common knowledge and culture among community members, but constructivists also have other tough problems to deal with. How, for instance, can AL members prioritize inter-subjectivity when they are so desperately trying to hold onto their intrinsic identity and egoist self-interest? Thus, it is unlikely that the Arab world will see economic convergence or cultural homogenization anytime soon.

Unresolved theoretical issues with Arab nationalism

International relations have embraced the Westphalian model, and the collapse of great empires has given rise to smaller, equal sovereign states with only national characteristics separating them. The rise of nationalism in Europe has been linked to these factors. Following the 1648 Westphalia Peace, the nation-state was born. Nationalism gradually spread throughout the Arab world in terms of diffusionism and historical ties to Europe.

In the continental European empires, nationalist movements emerged as a result of the transition from a feudal to a centrally planned system of governance. These movements were driven by political and religious differences and ultimately led to the creation of nation-states. Pan-Arabism had essentially played a unifying role, except against pre-existing divided entities, such as the provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Mosul, Yemen, Hejaz, Lebanon, Jerusalem, and Egypt.

Nationalism, then, was only one answer to two very different political issues in each case. Europeans have been copying the French Revolution because Napoleon presented it to the continent's peoples as an idol of collective authority rather than as a way to advance individual freedom (Kelly 2015, Kohn 1955). Lord Acton had given a thorough explanation of how Europeans came to dominate non-Europeans, particularly with regard to the emergence of nationalism in its entirety. However, Acton has offered a comprehensive analysis of the Eurocentric nationalism model, especially as it was implemented by European elites. They contended that because ruling families' interests, not those of nations, were involved, the old European system, which regulated borders and administration largely without taking into account popular desire, meant that nationalists' rights remained unacknowledged by governments and unassailable by citizens (Acton 1862).

Even when given the chance to implement pan-Arabism following World War I, the early Arabs rejected it outright, seeing it as neither desirable nor practical. Instead, they established three autonomous Arab states east of Suez at a Syrian-Iraqi congress that took place in Damascus (Khalidi 1991a). On the other hand, proponents of Arabism found it fascinating how nationalism was sweeping the globe. Hans Kohn has studied this phenomenon, which began in England in the seventeenth century and was mainly influenced by concepts of individual liberty and national organization. These concepts eventually made their way to the colonies of Asia and Africa, owing in large part to the French Revolution and the mediating role played by French intellectuals.

Arabism emerged as a result of modernization and the "revolution in the field of values," which paved the way for the creation of an imagined community throughout the Arab world and was similar to diffusionism. Benedict Anderson argues that the idea of "imagined community" can be incorporated into novels and newspapers, fostering a "belonging feeling" among readers through a combination of cultural factors, technological advancements in publishing, and the rise of capitalism in the publishing industry (Anderson 2006).

For this reason, the famous ode by Ibrahim al-Yaziji (1868), written in Lebanon, begins with the lines "Awake, O. Arabs and arise!" Similarly, some Arab intellectuals, such as Michel 'Aflaq, have invoked emotions and religion through the use of a "pseudo mystic way to frame the Islamic experience of Prophet Muhammad to transform Arab nationalism into a religion" (Wien 2017).

Because of these factors, the rise of Arabism bears a striking resemblance to Anderson's "Imagined community" theory. Some, however, believed that rather than adding to the arguments supporting nationalism as an ideology, Anderson's theory was better at explaining nationhood, which is a crucial aspect of nation-making. However, for the majority of the 20th century, the political discourse surrounding the "nationhood" approach has been dominated by

the ideology of establishing an Arab nation as a single homogenous entity from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf, bound by ties of religion, language, and history (Dawn 2000).

Even though most Arabs had remained faithful to the Ottoman dynasty state, peoples existed independently of the Ottoman hegemony, according to George Antonious, who had mentioned the givenness of Arab nationalism as a common belief in that milieu. Before the 1800s, Arabism was a given and did not require any justification (Kramer 1993). However, some academics have attempted to differentiate between the concept of "Arabness" and Arab nationalism; Arabness is a concept that has persisted since the beginning of recorded history and is probably here to stay, regardless of the course of future events (Kramer 1993). But for the Arabs, everything changed dramatically in the eighteenth century when the Ottoman rulers experienced an identity crisis.

For a very long time, Ottoman rulers had arranged their peoples according to their religion, disregarding factors like nationality or language. This made it possible for other religious groups (the millets) to live in harmony and even to regain their independence. Similar to how Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians did when they started to rediscover their cultural heritage in order to create homogenous national communities through political uprising (Cleveland 2015), local voices in the Arab provinces, particularly in greater Syria, were not only calling for reform but also for decentralization. Ever since they were able to forgo the need for protection from the might of the Islamic Empire, Arab intellectuals have gradually come to emphasize their Arabness.

Based on that context, Barnett postulates that the establishment of regional order in the Arab world resulted from the strengthening of state sovereignty and the dominance of Hussein's vision (the state-building school), which has, up to this point, mainly won the day in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Since then, Arab states have come to realize that Arab nationalism, as a force for integration, was no longer supported by or consistent with territorial legacy. These states are currently living their tangible existence as sovereign states. Even so, prior to the League of Arab States' membership expansion after 1945, the founding members of the organization—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen—held the primary discussions of inter-Arab politics by defining the nature of the relationship between state and nation (Barnett 1995).

Moreover, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq dominated the geopolitical landscape of the Arab world in the early 1930s. The remaining nations essentially do not exist. Therefore, nationalism has never been more important than security considerations for those recently independent states. Therefore, Arab nationalism was crucial to the struggle against Zionist organizations in Palestine because it was the best way to guarantee the states' unity as a security community, in which all members choose to stand together in the face of aggression and acknowledge that their mutual security is a matter of mutual concern (Roberts, Kingsbury, and Boutros-Ghali 1993).

Arab leaders, including King Faisal of Iraq, sent an official delegation led by Nuri Al-Said to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in 1931 in an effort to strengthen ties and promote unity and alliance (Mufeed 2004). Efforts to strengthen collective security were massively increased in the early 1940s in response to multilateral discussions about the potential for political unification between Egypt and Iraq. The Iraqi prime minister, Nuri-Said, also disclosed another agreement aimed at enhancing coordination among the Arab states. The subjects covered in the conversation were: (1) defense and foreign policy in the context of political cooperation; (2) economic cooperation; and (3) cooperation in the fields of social work and culture (Shanafeh 2013).

In fact, Arab leaders and nationalist movements in Iraq, Egypt, and Palestine have appropriated the concept of nationalism, while they all stand to gain from collective security. They were unable to complete the process of becoming a nation. This was depicted in the late

1930s when Nuri's plan to unite Iraq, Palestine, and the East of Jordan was thwarted by the British mandate, despite a provision granting the Jewish people the right to establish self-government, especially in areas populated primarily by Jews (Mufeed 2004). However, in retaliation for the Nuri's proposal for unification being rejected, the British government did not approve the creation of the AL until 1945.

Acton, therefore, argues that since nationalism is primarily a Eurocentric phenomenon, Arabs shouldn't waste their time copying how successful European nationalism has been in gaining traction. Although nationalism emerged from spontaneous political revolutions in Europe between 1821 and 1921 to establish some universal values, it mostly relied on a common language and shared history, according to Sati' al-Husri, who adamantly maintains that nationalism is more likely to be universal (Anderson 1979). In this context, Al-Husri has brought up the cases of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Germany, and Bulgaria, where it is clear that the history and native languages of the area had greater influence on the process of nation-state building. Since Elie Kedouri took Acton's side in his book "Nationalism" and rejected universal nationalism outright, arguing that nationalism cannot simply be relocated because it was discovered in Europe during the French Revolution in the eighteenth century and widely adopted by Europeans, scholars have not been particularly impressed with al-Husri's approach (Kedourie 2013).

Arab historians such as Mohammed Jaber al-Ansari have concluded that Arab nationalism has never succeeded historically, contrary to what most Arab nationalists sincerely believe. The problem went well beyond the rhetoric of universal nationalism because nationhood- and state-building processes in Arab politics have long been partially hidden by the structural crisis in Arab politics. Al-Ansari claims that the Arab world is geographically divided, which hinders the growth of Arab nationalism (جابر). These geographic rifts, which were essentially wide areas of uninhabited territory, further shattered and divided the political and urban fabrics of the Arab countries.

The desert is all too often seen as the pride land, the birthplace of the Arab people. Al-Ansari, however, contends that the desert has also served as a source of fragmentation and disintegration because it has been a major regressive force against urbanization, which Arab nations have been promoting throughout the post-colonial era (جابر). Al-Ansari once said that the desert has never been a source of unity in any shape, but rather has become the primary source of what he later referred to as "multiple ambushes," which are essentially made up of a massive rupture in both space and time.

According to Al-Ansari, the "Desert break" is to blame for the multiple ambushes because of the following: first, the spread of sizable deserted areas among Arab cities; Second, the history of droughts in the Arab world and land degradation have both been significantly impacted by natural droughts and periods of succession caused by desertification. Afterwards, the so-called "Social desertification" resulted from Bedouin pastoralists eventually conquering several ancient Arab cities (جابر).

Given that the nation-state is still regarded as one of the greatest achievements of Western civilization, its development from certain antiquated political structures, like the church, the city, and feudalism, was especially remarkable. It was seen as a natural progression that aided in the nation-state's gradual rise to prominence today. Al-Ansari has identified a notable void in the historical evolution of Arab nation-states through the prism of modernism, where traits like the importance of centralized power as a distinguishing feature of contemporary societies are rarely observed in Arab history. Therefore, incorporation of any kind between Arab states is quite impossible unless the current Arab states are able to continue growing naturally and establish themselves as legitimate nation-states.

Arab nationalists insisted that Arabs were a monocultural people who had historically remained unified and that their national cohesiveness served as additional evidence of their

authenticity as a people. Unfortunately, outside interference has destroyed their domestic cohesiveness and negatively impacted their future, leaving them vulnerable to oppression and heavy reliance to external powers. As demonstrated by the rhetoric of Michel 'Aflaq, one of the pioneers of Arab nationalism thought, Arab nationalists also frequently depend more and more on a sense of connection to Arab-Islamic civilization. Al-Ansari, however, thought that this view was a little reductionist because, following the elimination of Western colonization, and Pan-Turkism, Arab nationalism was already meaningless.

Abd Eillah Belkaziz proposed a comprehensive revision of the concept and general discourse of national unity by closely examining the lower echelons of integration and unity process in the Arab societies in order to find additional analysis to the question of Arab nationalism in the twenty-first century. The gradual establishment of Arab states, according to Belkaziz, was the first step toward solving this riddle in terms of developing the Arab nation (nationhood) in its broadest sense (Belkaziz 2010). However, Arab nationalism—which has nothing to do with identity—seemed unrealistic in the recent past, according to Belkaziz. This was mainly due to the decades-long sharp decline in nationalist theoretical literature in the Arab world (Belkaziz 2010). Scholarly works abound on the subject of Arab nationalism in the 20th century, which was primarily concerned with the formation of ideologies and the evolution of regimes. Until the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, which resulted in a periodization that was divided into "the rise of Arab nationalism" and the "formative years" of nationalist ideology, shaped by a steep decline in the literature, Arab nationalism eventually devolved into a delusory propagandistic ideology that was specifically intended to maintain the power of certain Arab autocrats. (Wien 2017).

In this way, Belkaziz clarifies the reasons behind the current decline in Arab nationalism among Arabs, as well as the divergent views regarding the nature and expression of Arab nationalism that exist between the "Maghreb" and "Mashriq" of the Arab world—that is, the regions that make up the Arab world's West and East. Rather than seeing the territorial state as the cornerstone for establishing Arab unity and ending outside intervention by former colonial powers, Mashriq tend to see it as little more than a tool of subversion, especially in light of the Maghreb, Egypt, and Yemen's efforts to strengthen it (Belkaziz 2010).

One example of the piecemeal approach found in the founding charter of the organization is the principle of upholding the status quo in relations between Arab states, or the reverence for sovereignty among AL members. Nevertheless, Article VII of the Arab League Charter, which mandated that adopted decisions be approved only by unanimous vote, was the true obstacle to the organization's possible rebirth.

Moreover, one significant weakness in AL's operations concerns the conflict resolution mechanism, namely the use of arbitration or mediation as an alternative to mandatory recourse for settling possible disputes amongst AL members. According to Article VI, decisions adopted by the Council with a majority vote will only bind the states that have consented to them, whereas decisions made by the Council with a unanimous vote will bind all of the League's member states. In either case, the decisions of the Council will be carried out by each member state in compliance with its own legal system (Arab States League 1945) Due to these kinds of challenges, Arab governments have found themselves either knowingly or unknowingly pursuing their own narrow interests at the expense of the welfare of the AL as a whole.

Examining the Arab nationalism hypothesis in theories of international relations (IRT)

It could be argued that the Neorealism theory of IR places a great deal of emphasis on structural anarchy, the global system, and the state as an integrated, cohesive actor. Therefore, Structural Realists—who hold that all states are equal except for the fact that some are more or less powerful than others—view states as black boxes (Mearsheimer 2007). States are also rational actors because

they can plan well-thought-out strategies to maximize their chances of survival (Mearsheimer 2007). However, because other countries are a continual threat, and there is no higher authority to which they could resort, in case of an attack, the anarchical structure of state governance promotes a survival mindset centered on self-help.

In a world governed by the self-help mechanism, where states' security is the ultimate goal for every state within the system, the selfish-materialistic approach will continue to have complete control over the mindsets of states. This led us to question whether the prospects for unitarian nationalist tactics could disprove the pragmatic assumptions about the anarchic character of the world system. In other words, are states willing to give up their materialistic and self-serving interests to any legal transnational organization? From a constructivist standpoint, any Arab state must first acknowledge that the current level of cooperation among some Arab governments is insufficient to support the Arab integration process in the real debate before it can effectively address these issues from within its borders.

Idealists must pay close attention to concepts like "Society" and "Common interest" in order to advance international social interaction and provide persuasive defenses of nationalist theory (Bull 2012). In this regard, Realists categorically rejected Hedley Bull's theory, claiming that the anarchy dilemma's power-seeking strategy character prevented it from being resolved. Bull claimed that a shared set of institutions, values, norms, and interests are developed as a means of minimizing the anarchy per se.

Consequently, in search of a substitute theory of international relations, Bull concentrated most of his efforts on the requirement of a common interest in global society. These days, many people use this theory to explain identity, cultural shifts, and even contrasting viewpoints on cooperation and coexistence in global society. Bull has shown some leanings toward (Hobbesian) Realism when it comes to military and security matters, whether they pertain to the security of a single state or the community at large. The limitations and defects of the 'Grotian' Idealistic viewpoints are primarily to blame for this (Wendt 1999b). Unfortunately, Bull's strongest arguments—which go beyond the idea that the anarchical system requires international society to arbitrate disputes—do not give us a thorough grasp of how AL works. The rationale behind this is that the theory of Arab nationalism seems to fit Bull's approach to a greater extent than Hobbesian Realistic approaches, which virtually fit the AL charter.

As previously mentioned, the AL's charter has held potential for integration along with seeds of disagreement and conflict. Consequently, it has become clear that the Arab system is undergoing a very sensitive stage that will ultimately culminate in its collapse following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Does this mean that Arab nationalism can no longer be institutionalized and that it is impossible to see the controversial security issues from a fair angle?

Neorealists usually concede that cooperation and integration between states are unachievable due to the constraints of the anarchical system. Alexander Wendt has therefore dared to expand the conceptual framework of 'National interest' beyond the perspectives of Neorealists after analyzing IRT. This may allow Arab nationalists to reconsider their presumptions once more. Wendt was able to accomplish this by participating in the third international ontology debate between Constructivists and Rationalists, specifically answering the question, 'What kind of 'stuff' the international system made of?' (Wendt 1999b)

While Realism has nearly the best reputation among IR theories due to its propensity to explain power and interest in terms of a materialist perspective, Wendt has categorically rejected Waltz's Realist micro-economic analogy and its individualist ontology. Both of them have observed the conflict in international regime theory between the inter-subjective epistemology implied by the regime concept and the individualist ontology that suggested the rationalist foundation of the theory, as subsequently confirmed by Friedrich Kratochwill and John Ruggie.

The question of whether systemic structures are reducible to preexisting agents or have some autonomy of their own has been explored in more detail in relation to the agent-structure problem in IR (Wendt 1999b). Thus, the need for a Constructivist social theory would supersede the anomalies of selfish-rationalist approaches that gravely undervalue the explanatory power of ideas, values, and institutions.

In response to Neorealism, Social Constructivism has been incorporated into IR theory through the following discussion of the problem: How do the concepts influence the interests of states? Wendt argued that we should start by providing an answer to the question ‘What causes what?’ given the inherent gap between theory and practice—also known as the ‘indetermination of theory by data’. The IR students did not raise enough of this kind of questions. Thus, Wendt proposed that the four sociologies of international politics be used, rather than other approaches, to distinguish between the Constructivist, materialist, and individual ontologies, as well as their respective merits (Wendt 1999b).

Social Constructivism holds that four sociological structures—materialist, idealist, individualist, and holist—are created through an ongoing process of interaction in which agent-structure is ever-present. This process yields identities and interests. The idea that identities and interests are set in stone based on values is contested by this idea. This 2x2 matrix combination model (materialist-individualist, materialist-holist) can be applied to any branch of social science (Wendt 1999b). Theoretically, then, Social Constructivism could facilitate the shift from materialist-individualist to idealist-holist sociology.

However, this cannot be achieved solely through the intersubjectivity of the Arab states into a common identity aimed at safeguarding their shared interests. Inter-subjectivity processes will inevitably lead to the unification of Arab states, and their people will naturally defend their cultural norms. They will get closer to the rationality principle as a result, and the community's unity will become its top priority. Because of this, it is difficult to say whether the actions of the Arab nations were driven by self-interested Realism or by their choice to actively engage in society and believe that their organizational resources would enable them to achieve their objectives. The Rational-realist assumption must give way to the Social-Constructivist assumption, however the AL must overcome its fundamental problems though.

In the end, Arab nationalism became a standard theory that addressed the institutionalization issues the AL faced, even though Constructivism and Neorealism made important theoretical contributions to the field of International Relations. That would however, place it in the same category as normative theories, which focused only on finding expedient solutions to political problems while ignoring factual aspects.

Consulting some well-known Arab nationalist writers can help us understand their sense of urgency when they were theorizing, especially when they backed the notion that military force should be used to back political leaders in order to achieve Arab unity at the expense of other factors (Choueiri 2001). Among these authors are Sami Shawkat, Zaki al-Arsuzi, and Mohammed Izzat Darwaza.

Al-Husri points out that some, such as Edmond Rabbath and Constantin Zuriq, emphasized the importance of secularism and a democratic parliamentary system in advancing the integration process, or that any political project aimed at achieving unity in the Arab world should take a backseat while the educational system is being reformed (Choueiri 2001). This is why, aside from their lack of interest in the democratization process and its role in reshaping identities and interests in the modern Arab world, the majority of Arab nationalists were excessively reductionist in all matters pertaining to international relations. Social Constructivism theoretically has the potential to bridge the institutionalization gap of nationalism in the Arab world, despite the majority of conventional explanations remaining stuck at blaming failure on colonialism or corporatist elites.

Conclusions

The majority of the contributions made over the years to construct the AL seem to have improved the piecemeal approach rather than the contrary. Therefore, despite the narrative that explicitly presents Arab unity as an extensional goal, the bulk of the AL charter has been constructed to validate this reality. Clauses that clearly support the status quo in relations between Arab states and uphold sovereignty are unquestionably preferable to the institution of common interest. The conflict resolution process used by AL, which uses arbitration or mediation rather than mandatory action to settle disagreements resulting from potential conflicts among its members, is another serious weakness in the organization's operations. Because those issues are institutional in nature, Arab states have either knowingly or unknowingly pursued their narrow interests at the expense of the fundamentals of Arab nationalism.

Arab nationalists were adamant that Arabs were a homogenous people who had remained together historically and that their uniqueness as a people was further enhanced by their national cohesion. Unfortunately, external intervention has jeopardized their future and severely torn them apart internally. Consequently, Arab nationalists eschewed the historical obstacles that faced Arab nationalism in the first half of the 20th century, including pan-Turkism, Western colonization, and Zionism, and instead chose to base their ideology solely on their sense of identity as members of Arab-Islamic civilization.

Under the selfish-materialistic approach, state mindsets will remain completely controlled by adopting the Neorealist hypothesis, which holds that in a world ruled by the self-help mechanism, every state's security is its first priority. This may lead one to question whether the prospects for Unitarian nationalist tactics are able to disprove the plausible assumptions about the anarchic character of the international system. Alternatively, are states willing to cede their self-serving and materialistic interests to any lawful transnational organization? From a constructivist standpoint, none of them can offer thorough responses to these queries unless they first acknowledge the incoherence of Arab nationalist theory; they must either concede that the current level of cooperation among certain Arab states is sufficient to ensure the theory's survival.

Contrary to what Neorealism assumes, Social Constructivists appear to be able to transition from materialist-individualist sociology to idealist-holist sociology. But this cannot be accomplished only by the Arab states' intersubjectivity into a common identity to protect their common interests. Arab states will become increasingly unified as a result of intersubjectivity processes, and their citizens will instinctively stand up for their cultural values. This will bring them closer to the rationality principle and make unity the community's main concern. Because of this, it is difficult to say whether the actions of the Arab nations were driven by self-interested Realism or by their choice to actively engage in society and believe that their organizational resources would enable them to achieve their objectives. As a corollary, the rational-Realist assumption must give way to the social-constructivist assumption, and the AL must solve its core issues.

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